Ljudska prava i ustav

Autor: Saša Gajin

 

Čemu ljudska prava, iz perspektive važećeg i budućeg ustavnopravnog sistema Srbije

Više od polovine teksta Ustava iz 2006. posvećeno je temi ljudskih prava. Idealno, unošenjem garancija ljudskih prava u najviši pravni akt političke zajednice afirmiše se princip ustavne demokratije, odnosno neposredno izražava stav da se uređenje odnosa u zajednici rukovodi načelom jednake slobode svakog njenog člana.

Pravno-politička zajednica nastaje i postoji na temelju zajedničkog i uzajamnog priznavanja članova zajednice kao međusobno jednakih u pravima i slobodama. Osnovni oblik akta priznanja upisan je u ustavni dokument zbog toga što se pomoću ovog dokumenta politička zajednica pravno konstituiše.

U tom smislu, u ustav se unosi niz pravnih pravila koja sadrže jemstva prava i sloboda članova zajednice. Uz njih, u ovaj tekst upisuju se i odredbe o organizaciji javne vlasti, odnosno organima koji imaju obavezu da obezbede poštovanje i zaštitu ljudskih prava.

Suprotno tome, potraga za alternativnim modelima pravnog i državnog ustrojstva vezuje se za primenu čitavog niza ekskluzivnih principa koji nužno reflektuju odnos dominacije između članova političke zajednice, koji odnos se pak utemeljuje u volji vladaoca ili metafizički uslovljenoj božijoj volji, prirodnom pravu i sl. Na taj način se konstituiše politička zajednica u kojoj su pojedini njeni članovi slobodniji od drugih.

Tako, pripadnost povlašćenim kategorijama obezbeđuje „višak slobode“ onima koji dele isto etničko poreklo, nacionalnost, jezik, boju kože, socijalni i ekonomski položaj, članstvo u političkoj stranci ili verskoj organizaciji, zdravstveno stanje, pol, seksualnu opredeljenost, uzrast, odnosno starosnu dob i drugima. Ostalima, onima koji ne pripadaju povlašćenim kategorijama, sleduje „manjak slobode“.

Ova dva osnovna tipa političke zajednice u današnje vreme realno koegzistiraju. U jednom broju država sistem ustavne demokratije uspešno je razvijen ili se razvija. U drugima i dalje dominira sistem koji ne obezbeđuje jednaku slobodu članovima zajednice.

Ako se pretpostavi da je osnovni cilj procesa političkih reformi u Srbiji konstituisanje efektivnog sistema ustavne demokratije, te da ovaj proces još nije okončan, postavlja se pitanje u kojoj meri je važeći Ustav doprineo ostvarenju osnovnog cilja. Ako se pak zaključi da bi ustavnom revizijom moglo da se popravi postojeće nezadovoljavajuće stanje, postavlja se pitanje u kom smeru je potrebno intervenisati u budućem ustavnom tekstu da bi se proces formiranja ustavne demokratije ubrzao.

Pravno-politička orijentacija Ustava iz 2006. i njegovi nedostaci

Uvodna rečenica prvog člana Ustava, koja na ranoromantičarski način definiše Srbiju kao državu koja „pripada“ istovremeno srpskom narodu i svim građanima koji u njoj žive, duboko je politički neiskrena. Sa prvog mesta u poretku ustavnih normi, ona konstituiše pravni sistem zemlje na međusobno sukobljenim principima.

Sa jedne strane, barata se rečima „svi građani“, kojima se u daljem tekstu prvog člana pridodaju reči „demokratija“ i „ljudska i manjinska prava i slobode“, čime se sugeriše primena inkluzivnog principa ustavne demokratije. Sa druge strane, politička zajednica se definiše kao država srpskog naroda, čime se obezbeđuje primena jednog od najučinkovitijih ekskluzivnih principa, principa nacionalne države.

Ideja o nacionalnoj državi je pre oko 25 godina na domaćoj političkoj sceni zauzela mesto do tada neprikosnovene ideje o državi radničke klase. Kao politički superioran, nacionalistički princip i u novovekovnom periodu istorijskog razvoja zemlje predstavlja stabilno tlo za izgradnju osobene strukture čitavog niza drugih principa dominacije, među kojima se ističu oni koji se vezuju za rasni, etnički, verski, politički, odnosno partijski, polni, rodni i seksualni identitet ljudi.

Međutim, kao što je navedeno, odnosi između članova zajednice uređuju se ili na temelju principa njihove jednake slobode ili na temelju principa njihove međusobne dominacije, ali ne i na temelju oba principa zajedno. Ako se ipak insistira na paralelnoj primeni oba principa, onda se to čini zbog političke rezervisanosti u pogledu ideološke svrsishodnosti, domašaja i praktičnih posledica primene svakog od njih pojedinačno.

Politički gledano, uzimajući u obzir nedovoljno razvijenu pravnu kulturu zajednice, čini se da je opravdano izraziti bojazan da bi ubedljivo demonstrirana neodlučnost ustavotvorca prema primeni principa ustavne demokratije mogla da stvori trajni osećaj sumnje u koncept ljudskih prava, naravno, ukoliko se prethodno ne zaključi da je ova neodlučnost zapravo rođena iz tradicionalno razvijene sumnje u ljudska prava. Pravno gledano, čini se da je načelna neiskrenost ustavotvorca u vreme pisanja ustavnog teksta mogla takođe da porodi i nebrigu za pojedina pravila ustavnopravnog sistema poštovanja i zaštite ljudskih prava.

Odredbe ustavnog teksta o pravima i slobodama ispunjavaju sadržinom temeljni pravno-sistemski okvir prava ljudskih prava. One odgovaraju na pitanja o listi, odnosno katalogu prava i sloboda, njihovim korisnicima, odnosno beneficijarima, kao i o licima koja su dužna da ih poštuju, odnosno adresatima ove obaveze.

Kad se radi o katalogu ljudskih prava, nebriga ustavotvorca dolazi do izražaja na nivou propisivanja načelnih pravila, kao i na nivou propisivanja pravila koja se vezuju za pojedina prava i slobode. Tako, u ustavni tekst nije upisano pravilo o nenabrojanim pravima – ovo pravilo čiji je cilj zaštita celovite slobode čoveka, koje potiče još iz IX amandmana na Ustav SAD sa kraja XVIII veka, a bilo je sadržano i u prethodno važećem ustavnom dokumentu zemlje, kaže da nije pravno dopušteno ograničavati ili negirati prava i slobode pod izgovorom da one nisu upisane u katalog ljudskih prava.

Pojedina prava i slobode nisu unete u ustavni katalog zbog toga što ustavopisac nije mogao da ih se seti dok je sastavljao listu ljudskih prava. Tako je iz Ustava otpala zabrana dužničkog ropstva, pravna garancija na osnovu koje se razlikuje moderno doba istorije čovečanstva, kao i jemstvo prava na privatnost, omnipotentnog prava od najvećeg značaja za obezbeđivanje efektivnog pravnog sistema zaštite slobode čoveka.

S obzirom na činjenicu da su obe ove garancije sadržavali raniji ustavi Srbije i federalne države kojoj je ona pripadala, zaboravnost ustavopisca dalje se nužno odražava i na primenu načelnog pravila o zabrani snižavanja dostignutog nivoa poštovanja i zaštite ljudskih prava. Iako se radi o jednom od temeljnih pravila ljudskih prava koje je eksplicitno uneto u ustavni tekst iz 2006, ustavopisac ga je na veoma grub način sam prekršio, možda zbog toga što ga nije ozbiljno ni shvatio.

Uočljivi su i drugi nedostaci ustavnih odredbi o pojedinim pravima i slobodama. Na primer, pravo na pravično suđenje koje se vezuje za odlučivanje u građanskom i krivičnom postupku, u ustavnom tekstu se pogrešno sistematizuje u okviru odredbi koje se odnose samo na užu kategoriju prava garantovanih u postupku utvrđivanja kaznene odgovornosti.

Ili, izmišlja se pravilo o ograničenju prava koje nema pravnog smisla, te se tako kaže da se sloboda misli, savesti i veroispovesti, kao i sloboda mišljenja i izražavanja, mogu ograničiti ako je to neophodno u demokratskom društvu radi, između ostalog, zaštite „morala demokratskog društva“. Slično tome, pravilo o ograničenju ljudskih prava u uslovima vanrednog stanja obesmišljava se na taj način što se u kategoriju tzv. „apsolutnih prava“ koje nije dopušteno ograničavati, uvodi širok krug onih koja pravno ne mogu imati ovo svojstvo.

Kad se radi o pravilima kojima se određuju beneficijari i adresati pojedinih prava i sloboda, ustavni tekst takođe pati od brojnih deficita. Prilikom formulisanja pravila o zabrani diskriminacije, ustavopisac nije smatrao za potrebno da pomene i seksualne manjine, iako se radi o grupama koje su veoma često i u značajnoj meri izložene diskriminatornom postupanju.

Pravo na brak se u ustavnom tekstu vezuje za heteroseksualnu zajednicu života, iako tog ograničavajućeg elementa nije bilo u istovrsnoj garanciji koja je bila upisana u prethodno važeći ustavni dokument. Sloboda odlučivanja o rađanju deteta, odnosno pravo na prekid trudnoće, pogrešno se jemči „svakome“, a ne samo ženi.

Uživanje slobode okupljanja na otvorenom i u zatvorenom prostoru jemči se samo građanima zemlje. Inače, opšte pravilo o položaju stranaca kao beneficijara prava i sloboda pati od temeljnog pravnog nedostatka, a to je da se ono pravno uverljivo može tumačiti na više različitih načina.

Takođe, ne može se sa lakoćom jednoznačno protumačiti ni pravilo o adresatima pravne garancije prava na pravnu pomoć. Nema ni načelnih pravila o adresatima. Iako se opšti zaključak o položaju adresata može posredno izvesti iz pojedinih odredbi, u ustavni tekst nisu prepisana pravila prethodno važećeg ustava o tome da obaveza poštovanja jemstava ljudskih prava pripada organima javne vlasti, kao i svima drugima, fizičkim i pravnim licima.

Najzad, čak se i pravila o međusobnom odnosu izvora prava ljudskih prava mogu različito tumačiti, i to u zavisnosti od toga da li se prednost daje pravilu o formalnom primatu ustavnih odredbi nad odredbama međunarodnog dokumenta, ili pak onom na osnovu kojeg se posebna pravila o ljudskim pravima iz drugih izvora prava usisavaju u ustavnopravni sistem, a koje kaže, između ostalog, da se Ustavom jemče i neposredno primenjuju prava i slobode koje potiču iz međunarodnog prava.

Preporučeni pravci izmene ustavnih pravila o ljudskim pravima

Navedeni i drugi nedostaci ustavnog teksta koji se odnose na ljudska prava mogu se ukloniti u postupku ustavne revizije. Ako se pođe od pretpostavke da bi cilj izrade novih ustavnih odredbi o pravima i slobodama trebalo da bude stvaranje pravno-političkog okruženja koje pogoduje efektivnoj primeni principa ustavne demokratije, čini se da bi prilikom njihovog formulisanja trebalo posebno voditi računa o tri zahteva.

Prvo, budući ustav trebalo bi za sebe da obezbedi ulogu beskompromisnog političkog promotera principa ustavne demokratije.

Osnovna i zajednička poruka ustavnih odredbi o ljudskim pravima i organizaciji javne vlasti ne bi smela da stvori sumnju u pogledu načela na kojima se konstituiše politička zajednica. Ako se pomoću novog ustavnog dokumenta želi obezbediti jednaka sfera slobode za svakog člana političke zajednice, onda nijedno ustavno pravilo ne bi smelo da se nađe u opoziciji prema ovom jedinstvenom pristupu. U tom smislu, tekst ustava trebalo bi osloboditi postojećeg balasta antinomičnih principa.

Kategoričkim odustajanjem od koncepta nacionalne države otvorio bi se put uređenju političke zajednice izvan odnosa dominacije između njenih članova. Legitimni interesi većinskih, odnosno manjinskih grupa koje sebe identifikuju na osnovu nacionalnih, etničkih, verskih, socijalnih, ekonomskih, političkih, polnih, rodnih, seksualnih i drugih obeležja, mogli bi se na taj način u punoj meri zadovoljiti, i to ne na štetu ostalih.

Drugo, posao izrade novih ustavnih odredbi trebalo bi u potpunosti vezati za princip ustavne demokratije, posebno u pogledu političke participacije svih zainteresovanih strana.

Da bi se obezbedilo zadovoljenje legitimnih interesa članova političke zajednice, u postupku formulisanja novih ustavnih odredbi trebalo bi da učestvuju svi oni na koje se te odredbe odnose ili kojih se one tiču. Porazno iskustvo pisanja Ustava iz 2006. u tajnosti i njegovog usvajanja bez ikakve rasprave o sadržini pojedinih ustavnih odredbi, ne bi se smelo ponoviti.

Aktiviranjem mehanizama političke participacije u pripremi ustavnog dokumenta omogućila bi se artikulacija bitno raznovrsnih i često veoma suprotstavljenih interesa članova političke zajednice, kao i njihovo međusobno usaglašavanje. Bez obzira na to što bi se radilo o zametnom poduhvatu, sam tok postizanja društvenog konsenzusa o sadržini novih pravila garantovao bi kvalitet i dugovečnost budućim ustavnim rešenjima.

Treće, nova ustavna pravila o ljudskim pravima ne bi smela da sadrže pozitivnopravne greške koje bitno otežavaju primenu principa ustavne demokratije.

Ako su zainteresovane strane saglasne sa sadržinom ustavnih pravila, onda se ta pravila po svojoj prirodi ne mogu kvalifikovati kao pogrešna. Dakle, mehanizmi političke participacije u pisanju novog ustava mogli bi da preuzmu funkciju identifikacije i izbegavanja grešaka koje su nastale u procesu stvaranja važećeg ustavnog teksta.

Kao što je već pokazano, jedna grupa ovih grešaka ima pravno-metodološki karakter i zbog toga se one mogu na jednostavan način ispraviti. Druga grupa grešaka ima pravno-ideološki karakter jer su one upravo nastale na temelju primene posebnih ekskluzivnih principa dominacije u odnosu između članova zajednice. Njihovo ispravljanje pretpostavlja bezuslovno pristajanje budućeg ustavotvorca uz princip ustavne demokratije, kao i neposredno suočavanje sa ovim greškama putem demokratskih participativnih mehanizama.
Tekst je nastao u realizaciji projekta „Iščekujući novi ustav“ Evropskog pokreta u Srbiji.

 

Human Rights? What for?

Author: Saša Gajin

 

From the perspective of the present and future constitutional law system in Serbia

More than one half of the Constitution of 2006 is devoted to the subject of human rights. Ideally, the incorporation of human rights guarantees in the supreme legal act of a political community asserts the principle of constitutional democracy and directly expresses the view that the relations in the community are governed by the principle of equal freedom of every one of its members.

A legal-political community is born and exists on the basis of the common and reciprocal recognition by the community members that they all have equal rights and freedoms. The act of recognition is inscribed in its basic form in the constitutional document because this document is instrumental in the legal establishment of the political community.

Pursuant to this, a series of legal rules on the guarantees of rights and freedoms is incorporated in a constitution. They are accompanied by provisions on the organisation of the public authorities, i.e. the bodies duty-bound to secure the respect and protection of human rights.

Conversely, the pursuit of alternative models of the legal and state order, grounded in the will of the ruler or metaphysically conditioned divine will, natural law and the like, involves the application of a whole series of exclusive principles reflecting inevitably the relationship of predominance between the political community members. The result is a political community in which some of its members are freer than others.

To be a part of the privileged categories secures “a surplus of freedom” for those sharing the same ethnic origin, nationality, language, colour of their skin, social and economic standing, membership in a political party or a religious organization, state of their health, sex, sexual orientation, age etc. The others, those who do not belong to the privileged categories, are in for “a deficit of freedom”.

These two principal types of the political community factually coexist in present-day time. In a certain number of states the constitutional democracy system has evolved or is evolving successfully. A system which does not secure equal freedom for the members of the community still reigns in others.

If one assumes that the chief objective of the political reforms in Serbia is the creation of an effective system of constitutional democracy and that this process is still under way, the question arises as to how much has the constitution now in force contributed to the accomplishment of the chief objective. If one concludes that a constitutional revision could remedy the current unsatisfactory state of affairs, the question arises as to which direction should the intervention in the future constitutional text take in order to expedite the formation of the constitutional democracy.

The legal-political orientation of the Constitution of 2006 and its defects

The introductory sentence of the first article in the Constitution defining Serbia in an early-romanticist manner as a state which “belongs” equally to the Serbian people and all citizens living in it is politically profoundly insincere. As it occupies the first place in the order of constitutional norms, it grounds the country’s legal system in mutually conflicting principles.

On the one hand, it uses the words ‘all citizens’ and further down in the first article the words ‘democracy’ and ‘human and minority rights and freedoms’ suggestive of the application of the all-inclusive principle of constitutional democracy. On the other, the political community is defined as the state of the Serbian people securing the application of one of the most effective exclusive principles of a nation-state.

Some 25 years ago the nation-state idea on the domestic political stage took the place of the idea of the working class state inviolable hitherto. The nationalist principle, being politically superior, in the country’s historical evolution in the new century offers a solid ground for the construction of a specific edifice of a whole series of other principles of predominance, notably those associated with the racial, ethnic, religious, political, i.e. party, sexual, gender and sexual identity.

However, as it has been said, the relations among members of the community are governed either by the principle of their equal freedom or by the principle of domination of some over the others, but never by both these principles at the same time. If it is nonetheless insisted that the two principles be applied in parallel, this is done because of political hesitation regarding the ideological purposefulness, reach and practical consequences of the application of either of them separately.

Politically speaking, bearing in mind the insufficiently developed legal culture of the community, it seems justified to fear that the convincingly demonstrated vacillation of the constitution maker regarding the application of the principle of constitutional democracy could induce a persistent doubt about the concept of human rights, unless, of course, one concludes that this indecision is, in fact, due to the tradition-rooted doubt about human rights. Legally speaking, it appears that the basic insincerity of the constitution maker at the time when the text was written could also generate the lack of concern for individual rules of the constitutional law system bearing on the respect and protection of human rights.

The constitutional provisions on the rights and freedoms give substance to the fundamental legal-systemic framework of human rights law. They answer the question about the list, i.e. the catalogue of rights and freedoms, their holders, i.e. beneficiaries and the persons bound to respect them, i.e. the addresses of the obligations.

As for the catalogue of human rights, the constitution maker’s carelessness is evident in the prescription of principled rules and rules associated with individual rights and freedoms. The constitutional text, for instance, does not feature a rule about non-enumerated rights. This rule whose purpose is to protect man’s freedom in its totality and which originated in the Ninth Amendment of the US Constitution as early as the late 18th century and was included in the preceding constitution of Serbia, says that is legally inadmissible to restrict or deny rights and freedoms on the pretext that they have not been inscribed in the human rights catalogue.

Individual rights and freedoms have not been included in the constitutional catalogue because they slipped the memory of the constitution maker as he was writing the list of human rights. This is why the prohibition of debt servitude – a legal guarantee distinguishing the modern era in the human history – and the guarantee of the right to privacy – an omnipotent right of paramount significance if the legal system of the protection of human freedom is to function effectively – are missing from the Constitution.

In view of the fact that these two guarantees featured in the earlier constitutions of Serbia and the federal state it was a part of, the constitution maker’s forgetfulness cannot but find its reflection in the application of the principled rule on the prohibition to lower the achieved level in the respect and protection of human rights. Although it is one of the fundamental rules in human rights law explicitly stated in the Constitution of 2006, the constitution maker himself breached it very crudely, perhaps because he did not take it seriously enough.

Other shortcomings of the constitutional provisions on individual rights and freedoms also strike the eye. For instance, the right to a fair trial associated with decision-making in civil and criminal proceedings is wrongly systematised in the constitutional text as it is included in provisions which relate only to a narrower category of rights guaranteed in the procedure concerning the investigation of criminal responsibility.

Or, a rule on the restriction of rights is cooked up and lacks legal sense because it says that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the freedom of opinion and expression may be restricted if it is necessary in a democratic society in order, among other things, to protect the “morality of the democratic society”. Likewise, the rule on the restriction of human rights in a state of emergency is stripped of sense because a broad circle of those who cannot enjoy this property is included in the category of so-called “absolute rights” which may not be restricted.

With regard to the rules determining the beneficiaries and addressees of individual rights and freedoms, the Constitution also suffers from numerous shortcomings. The constitution maker did not deem it necessary when wording the rules on the prohibition of discrimination to mention sexual minorities even though these groups are very often and to a significant extent exposed to discriminatory treatment.

The right to marriage in the constitutional text is associated with a heterosexual community of life even though this restrictive element was absent in the guarantee of the same type featuring in the preceding constitutional document. The freedom to decide whether to give birth to a child, i.e. the right to terminate pregnancy is wrongly guaranteed to “everyone” rather than to women alone.

The enjoyment of freedom to assemble in open and closed spaces is guaranteed only to the country’s citizens. The general rule on the status of foreign nationals as beneficiaries of rights and freedoms suffers any way from a fundamental legal defect as it can be interpreted in a number of legally convincing ways.

Neither it is easy to arrive at a clear interpretation of the rule on the addressees of the legal guarantees of the right to legal aid. Principled rules on the addressees are also missing. Although it is possible to deduce the status of the addressees from individual provisions, the constitutional text does not take over the rules from the preceding constitution stipulating that the obligation to respect the guarantees of human rights is incumbent upon the public authorities and all other natural and legal persons.

Finally, even the rules on the relationship of human rights law authorities may be interpreted in different ways, depending on whether the priority is accorded to the formal primacy of constitutional provisions over the provisions in international documents or to the rule which says that human rights rules from other authorities of law are absorbed by the constitutional system, and, among other things, that the Constitution guarantees and enables direct application of the rights and freedoms arising from international law.

Recommendations on possible changes of the constitutional rules on human rights

The abovementioned and other deficiencies in the constitutional text relative to human rights can be removed by constitutional revision. If one starts from the assumption that the purpose of the new constitutional provisions on the rights and freedoms should be the creation of a legal-political environment favouring an effective application of the principle of constitutional democracy, it seems that in their wording particular note should be made of three requirements.

Firstly, the future constitution should secure for itself the role of an uncompromising political advocate of the principleof constitutional democracy.

The principal and joint message of the constitutional provisions on human rights and the organisation of government should not provoke doubts about the principles underlying the political community. If one wishes to secure an equal sphere of freedom for every member of the political community with the help of a new constitutional document, then not a single constitutional rule should be in opposition to this uniform approach. In this sense, the text of the constitution ought to be rid of the current ballast of antinomic principles.

The categorical renouncement of the nation-state concept would pave the way for the regulation of the political community outside the domination relationships between its members. The legitimate interests of the majority and minority groups whose self-identification is based on national, ethnic, religious, social economic, political, sexual, gender and other properties could be thus fully satisfied and itwould not damage the interests of others.

Secondly, the work involving the drafting of new constitutional provisions should be closely tied to the principle of constitutional democracy, particularly with regard to the political participation of all parties concerned.

To secure the satisfaction of the legitimate interests of the members of the political community, the procedure concerning the wording of new constitutional provisions should involve all the subjects concerned or affected by them. The devastating experience with the Constitution of 2006, written in secrecy and followed by its adoption without any debate about the contents of individual constitutional provisions, may not be repeated.

The activation of the mechanisms of political participation in the drafting of a new constitutional document would make it possible to articulate substantially diverse and often highly opposed interests of the members of the political community and their mutual harmonisation. Although it would be no mean feat, the course embarked upon to arrive at the social consensus on the contents of new rules would guarantee high quality and long life of the future constitutional solutions.

Thirdly, new constitutional rules on human rights should be free of positive law errors rendering much more difficult the application of the principle of constitutional democracy.

If all parties concerned agree with the contents of constitutional rules, then these rules by their nature cannot be seen as wrong. Therefore, the mechanisms of the political participation in the drafting of a new constitution could serve to identify and avoid mistakes occurred when the constitutional text currently in force was written.

As it has already been shown, one batch of these mistakes is of a legal-methodological nature and they are easy to rectify. Another batch of mistakes is of a legal-ideological nature precisely because they are due to the application of special exclusive principles of domination in the relationships between the community members. Their amendment presumes unconditional commitment of the future constitution maker to the principle of constitutional democracy and dealing with these mistakes through democratic participative mechanisms.
Translated by Mirka Jankovic

Ales Bialiatski – 2014 Civil Rights Defender of the Year

 

Ales Bialiatski, founder of the Belarusian human rights organisation Viasna, is the recipient of the 2014 Civil Rights Defender of the Year Award. For over 30 years, he has pursued a life of continuous struggle to campaign for democracy and human rights, first in the Soviet Union and then in Belarus.

Ales is one of eleven political prisoners held in jail by the Belarusian authorities in a country often referred to as ”the last dictatorship in Europe”, sentenced to 4.5 years in prison for tax evasion in a trial with clear political overtones. He was arrested on 4 August 2011. Since then he has been imprisoned and prevented from communicating freely with the outside world. Being the head of the country’s leading human rights organisation Viasna Ales Bialiatski is a central figure in Belarusian civil society.

Valiantsin Stefanovitj is vice president of Viasna:
“It is important for Ales to receive this recognition. He is a strong and warm person who is extremely passionate about democracy and human rights. An external show of support like this award goes a long way to strengthening both him and all of us at Viasna and also provides the inspiration to continue to fight for a democratic Belarus. Only with pressure from the outside world can we bring about long lasting change. It was really exciting for me to write the letter to Ales and tell him about the prize. Unfortunately I do not know if the letter arrived as we have not yet received a response,” said Valiantsin.

Since the establishment of Viasna in 1996, Ales has been arrested over 20 times. Many of these arrests have been for minor infringements such as handing out copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

“The trial of Ales Bialiatski was initiated despite international protests and demands for his release. The process of prosecuting Ales was directly linked to his human rights work and the verdict serves as a warning to the entire Belarusian civil society”, says Robert Hårdh, Director of Civil Rights Defenders.

Ales has previously been honoured with several other awards, including the Swedish Per Anger Prize, The Sakharov Prize and Homo Homini Prize. He has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize twice, in 2006 and 2007.

The Civil Rights Defender of the Year Award is handed out on 4 April, which is the date of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. The award is given during Civil Rights Defenders’ annual conference Defenders’ Days, when human rights defenders from around the world gather in Stockholm. Ales’ colleague Tatsiana Revjaka and his wife Natalia Pinchuk are in Stockholm to receive the award on his behalf.

Benedicte Berner, acting chair of Civil Rights Defenders’ Board, talks about the recipient of the Award

Short film with Ales’ wife and colleagues

For more information on Ales Bialiatski and the situation in Belarus

To book interviews with Ales’ wife Natalia or his colleague Tatsiana, please contact:
Natasha Jevtic Esbjörnson, +46 76 576 27 62, natasha.esbjornson@civilrightsdefenders.org

About Viasna
Viasna helps thousands of people every year, mainly through the provision of free legal aid. In 2003 the authorities withdrew the organisation’s registration certificate – a clear violation of freedom of association under the UN Human Rights Committee. After several failed attempts to re-register, Viasna works without permission from the authorities – a violation that can result in up to two years in prison. The Belarusian security service, the KGB, constantly monitor their activities. Nevertheless they continue to work for human rights in Belarus.

About Belarus
Belarus became independent in 1991 with the dissolution Soviet Union. The country has been ruled by Alexander Lukashenka since 1994. Belarus is the only country in Europe still using capital punishment. The situation for human rights defenders in Belarus has reached a new low since the 2010 presidential election, when the regime launched a massive campaign against civil society in which the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of association is routinely violated. During the post-election demonstrations in 2010, the security forces arrested over 700 people. Organisations and political parties are denied permission to register their organisations with those who are unable to register being banned from working in Belarus. Operation of such an organisation without the necessary state permit can result in several years in prison.

Okrugli sto: Obrazovanje za Pomirenje: Uloga obrazovanja u procesu utvrđivanja odgovornosti i pomirenja

Poštovani,

Fond za humanitarno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union u Beogradu i Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija Vas poziva da učestvujete na Okruglom stolu Obrazovanje za Pomirenje: Uloga obrazovanja u procesu utvrđivanja odgovornosti i pomirenja, koji će se održati na Pravnom fakultetu Univerziteta Union, 28. marta 2014. 

Fond za humanitarno pravo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union i Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija ovim okruglim stolom žele da otvore nekoliko važnih pitanja – od pitanja koja je uloga obrazovanja u procesu pomirenja nakon perioda nasilnih suboka, postojanja potrebe akademskih institucija za uvođenjem tema suočavanja sa prošlošću i bliske prošlosti u okvirekurikuluma, odnosa formalnih i neformalnih programa ovog tipa, do pitanja edukativnih materijala koji će biti prezentovani na ovakvim programima.

 

Fond za humanitarno pravo

Pravni fakultet Univerziteta Union

Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija

 

Poziv za Okrugli sto

Papir za diskusiju – Obrazovanje za Pomirenje – prezentacija publikacije i ekspertski sastanak

Agenda za okrugli sto Obrazovanje za Pomirenje Uloga obrazovanja u procesu utvrđivanja odgovornosti i pomirenja

ZAHTEV VLADI REPUBLIKE SRBIJE DA ORGANIZACIJAMA CIVILNOG DRUŠTVA OMOGUĆI PRISTUP DOKUMENTIMA O SADRŽINI ZAKONA

Koalicija za pristup pravdi zahteva od vlade Republike Srbije da bez odlaganja omogući organizacijama civilnog društva pristup dokumentima koji se odnose na sadržinu zakona čije se usvajanje priprema. U skladu sa strateškim opredeljenjima Republike Srbije, organizacije civilnog društva trebalo bi da imaju ključnu ulogu u zakonodavnim reformama i drugim aspektima procesa pridruživanja zemlje Evropskoj Uniji.

Koalicija za pristup pravdi najoštije protestuje protiv odluke Kancelarije za evropske integracije da ne dozvoli organizacijama civilnog društva pristup dokumentu koji sadrži komentare Evropske komisije na Nacrt zakona o javnom informisanju i medijima. Ova odluka koja nema nikakvo utemeljenje u Zakonu o slobodnom pristupu informacijama od javnog značaja, neposredno podstiče nadležna ministarstva da propisuju nova zakonska pravila skriveni od očiju javnosti.

Skrećemo pažnju na činjenicu da su kometari Evropske komisije dostavljeni Kancelariji za evropske integracije pre više od 45 dana,  a da je nadležno Ministarstvo kulture i javnog informisanja više puta pisanim putem potvrdilo da ono nije dobilo te komentare od Kancelarije. U vezi sa tim, Koalicija traži odgovor vlade Republike Srbije na pitanje ko i na osnovu kojih ovlašćenja može unutar Kancelarije da odluči o tome da li će se javnost i nadležno ministarstvo upoznati sa sadržinom dokumenata koji stižu iz Brisela, a koji se vezujuza izradu novih zakonskih propisa.

Medijski zakoni sadrže regulativu od posebnog značaja za demokratski poredak zemlje i ne bi smeli da budu predmet obrade skrivenih političkih agendi ministarstva i drugih zainteresovanih strana. Takođe, rad na izmeni celokupnog  zakonodavstva zemlje u procesu pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji ne bi smeo da bude opterećen demokratskim deficitima, jer je upravo razvoj demokratije, odnosno političke participacije, kao i sistema poštovanja i zaštite prava i sloboda onih na koje se zakoni odnose, osnovni ciljevropskih integracija društva. Zbog toga Koalicija za pristup pravdi zahteva od vlade Republike Srbije da bez odlaganja preduzme sve neophodne mere i neposredno obezbedi participativnu ulogu građana u procesu zakonodavne reforme u skladu sa najvišim demokratskim standardima modernog društva.

U Beogradu, 06. novembra 2013.

Koaliciju za pristup pravdi čine sledeće organizacije:

Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija, Civil Rights Defenders, CHRIS – mreža odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Fond za humanitarno pravo, Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava, Nezavisno društvo novinara Vojvodine, Sandžački odbor za zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda, Praxis i Nezavisno udruženje novinara Srbije.

SAOPŠTENJE KOALICIJE ZA PRISTUP PRAVDI

STATEMENT OF THE COALITION FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE